Tuesday, April 27, 2010

(CR) Another RC Resource

For those looking for something else to read along with Bridges, here's a link to an essay by a physics instructor defending RC (thanks to Barry for the link):



As I see it, Dykstra's account of "realism" is a strawperson. Here's my (2005) characterization and defense of fallibilistic realism:



  1. Is it true, as Dykstra says, that "... in radical constructivism, truth is not the point, as such truth is not accessible"? And if it is the case that truth is not accessible, would it not be a truth-claim to say so?

  2. Its very inaccessibility certainly strikes Dykstra as accessible (reminds me of Kant's talk of the noumenal realm). Furthermore, as you claim, he takes it to be true that it's inaccessible -- a self-reflexively inconsistent move. The lesson: no one could ever utter a truth about truth's (general) inaccessibility. So, RC rejects only a certain subset of truth claims (those of the realist, for one) leaving their preferred truths untouched and accessible.

  3. On Page 82-83 Bridges, Hans “pretends” to be “infected” with a “minimal ontology”. I wonder-does EvG accept this position as well: or by “pretend” do we mean hypothetical? And, Hans claims to know himself (83), Will EvG make a similar claim?

    In my view, an acceptance of a “minimal ontology” concerning the indubitable matter of individual existence amounts to a truth claim; one that both the realist and constructivist might pronounce in a simple statement: ‘I know I exist'. Is this a reasonable assumption?