(E&M) The Problem of Unconceptualized Apples

Constructivism v. Realism

The Problem of Unconceptualized Apples

For von Glasersfeld, metaphysical realism (MR) assumes that truth is a correspondence relation (MR doesn't entail correspondence truth, but we can leave that aside): when a concept (C) corresponds to the way the world (W) is, it is true (and false otherwise).

C ---corresponds ---->W = true
C ---fails to correspond--->W = false

Von Glasersfeld's central idea seems to be this:  in order for me to know whether any given concept corresponds to some aspect of the world, and assuming that I have a clear understanding of the nature of correspondence itself, it seems that I would need independent access to two things: (1) the concept and (2) the relevant portion of the world. Only then will I be in a position to judge whether the two correspond. Obviously, I have (at least partial) access to my own concepts through simple reflection. Do I also have independent, nonconceptual access to the world? (It must be nonconceptual, otherwise I will be simply comparing my concepts with other of my concepts -- an activity more in line with the coherence theory of truth). Following the quote, I offer my reconstruction of von Glasersfeld's rejection of MR:

[T]he unanswerable question whether, or to what extent, any picture our senses "convey" might correspond to the "objective" reality is still today the crux of all theory of knowledge. Sextus used, among other things, an apple as an example. To our senses it appears smooth, scented, sweet, and yellow -- but it is far from self-evident that the real apple possesses these properties, just as it is not at all obvious that it does not possess other properties as well, properties that are simply not perceived by our senses. The question is unanswerable, because no matter what we do, we can check our perceptions only by means of other perceptions, but never with the apple as it might be before we perceive it.
----- E. von Glasersfeld, “An Introduction to Radical Constructivism”

1. All concepts are in the mind

2. All concepts are conceptualized

3. All concepts are concepts-of-some-x

4. All concepts-of-some-x are in the mind (from 1)

5. There can be no unconceptualized concepts-of-some-x (from 2)

6. All concepts of apples are concepts-of-some-x (from 3)

7. There can be no unconceptualized concepts of apples (from 5 and 6)

8. There can be no concept of an apple that is not a concept (truism)

9. The referent of the realist’s phrase “unconceptualized apple” is not (simply) a concept (an essential assumption of realism)

10. There can be no concepts of unconceptualized apples (from 8 and 9) (von G.: “…we cannot possibly conceive of an unexperienced world”)

11. Metaphysical realism (MR) involves concepts of unconceptualized apples. (By definition; here’s a typical realist concept: “if every concept-user were suddenly to disappear, apples – unconceptualized and unconceptualizable – would still exist.”)

12. MR is wrong and von Glasersfeld’s constructivism right (from 10 and 11)