The Possibility of Benign Envy

Envy, like jealousy, is a triadic relation, as both involve a subject, a rival, and a good (where the difference between the two amounts to a shifting locus of concern from envy of the rival to jealousy of the good.)

The entry on envy in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy touches on the possibility of a benign, admiring form of envy designed solely to secure for the subject (S) some good (G) possessed by a rival (R) (in contrast to the more commonplace invidious, malicious envy that involves undermining the rival). In other words:

S is benignly envious of R if he/she hopes merely to possess G

and

S is invidiously envious if he/she hopes to relieve R of G.

Let's say I'm envious of a colleague's publication record. My envy remains emulative and apparently benign so long as I act only to match or exceed ("outdo") my colleague's record (perhaps I publish as much, more, or works of better quality than my colleague). In contrast, my envy is invidious to the extent that I act to undermine ("undo") my colleague's record (perhaps, though I fail to improve my own publication record, I labor systematically to critique or belittle my colleague's accomplishments).

While the second form of envy is clearly unacceptable, is the first entirely benign?


DKJ