Today in "The Nature of Human Nature" we breifly touched on a potential incompatibility between the robust defense of (nonhuman) animal rights and a pro-choice position on abortion:
If one supports, say, the rights of dogs, cats, or even lowly rats or fish, then shouldn't one, for consistency's sake, favor the basic rights of fetuses over a woman's right to choose abortion (in non-emergency situations)?
This is enough to rock the ideological foundations of many pro-choice animal ethicists, but I don't think it should. Aside from theological musings about human "ensoulment" at conception, the considerable intrinsic value of humans and nonhumans alike arises in the first instance from their degree of sentience (or capacity consciously to experience painful or pleasurable states). Science and commonsense conspire to suggest that blastocysts, zygotes, and early fetuses are in fact nonsentient; that is, constitutively unable to think or want or prefer or (consciously) feel anything at all.
However, the eventual sentience of most later-stage fetuses introduces a potential conflict in basic rights. At that point, (extrinsic, relational duties notwithstanding) we must consider both the emerging moral status of developing fetuses and their mothers' right to privacy and self-determination. Distinguishing "primary" rightholders (mothers) from "subserviant" rightholders (sentient fetuses), Gary Franzione (of Rutgers Law Center) offers one solution here.
Comments and suggestions always welcome.
DKJ
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