DKBJ's MCLA Blog
Wednesday, January 21, 2026
What is Philosophy?
Philosophy is the systematic study of ideas and issues, a reasoned pursuit of fundamental truths, a quest for a comprehensive understanding of the world, a study of principles of conduct, and much more. Every domain of human existence raises questions to which its techniques and theories apply, and its methods may be used in the study of any subject or the pursuit of any vocation. Indeed, philosophy is in a sense inescapable: life confronts every thoughtful person with some philosophical questions, and nearly everyone is often guided by philosophical assumptions, even if unconsciously. One need not be unprepared. To a large extent one can choose how reflective one will be in clarifying and developing one's philosophical assumptions, and how well prepared one is for the philosophical questions life presents. Philosophical training enhances our problem-solving capacities, our abilities to understand and express ideas, and our persuasive powers. It also develops understanding and enjoyment of things whose absence impoverishes many lives: such things as aesthetic experience, communication with many different kinds of people, lively discussion of current issues, the discerning observation of human behavior, and intellectual zest. In these and other ways the study of philosophy contributes immeasurably in both academic and other pursuits.
The problem-solving, analytical,judgment, and synthesizing capacities philosophy develops are unrestricted in their scope and unlimited in their usefulness. This makes philosophy especially good preparation for positions of leadership, responsibility, or management. A major or minor in philosophy can easily be integrated with requirements for nearly any entry-level job; but philosophical training, particularly in its development of many transferable skills, is especially significant for its long-term benefits in career advancement.
Wisdom, leadership, and the capacity to resolve human conflicts cannot be guaranteed by any course of study; but philosophy has traditionally pursued these ideals systematically, and its methods, its literature, and its ideas are of constant use in the quest to realize them. Sound reasoning, critical thinking, well constructed prose, maturity of judgment, a strong sense of relevance, and an enlightened consciousness are never obsolete, nor are they subject to the fluctuating demands of the marketplace. The study of philosophy is the most direct route, and in many cases the only route, to the full development of these qualities.
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I also appreciate these comments from Anthony Quinton, suggesting (to me, at least) that philosophy is a refinement and extension of critical thinking:
Most definitions of philosophy are fairly controversial, particularly if they aim to be at all interesting or profound. That is partly because what has been called philosophy has changed radically in scope in the course of history, with many inquiries that were originally part of it having detached themselves from it. The shortest definition, and it is quite a good one, is that philosophy is thinking about thinking. That brings out the generally second-order character of the subject, as reflective thought about particular kinds of thinking — formation of beliefs, claims to knowledge — about the world or large parts of it. A more detailed, but still uncontroversial comprehensive, definition is that philosophy is rationally critical thinking, of a more or less systematic kind about the general nature of the world (metaphysics or theory of existence), the justification of belief (epistemology or theory of knowledge), and and the conduct of life (ethics or theory of value).
Thursday, January 15, 2026
(EM) Epistemological Poetry
On Knowing
To know or not to know the world:
Are words and worlds themselves impearled,
Cerebral grit, strung end-to-end;
My thoughts of things and things a blend
Of ideation and pretend?
Or might I sometimes speak the truth
(However bold, or worse -- uncouth)
If what I think or say reflects
The state of things my mind detects,
My words denote, the world projects?
DKBJ
PS. Our queries this semester reflect the centrality of Friedrich Engels' "two great camps thesis":
In what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality? Thus the question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of the spirit to nature [is] the paramount question of the whole of philosophy (Engels, F., Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy).
Saturday, January 03, 2026
Monday, December 08, 2025
The Problem of Unconceptualized Apples
For the "radical constructivist" Ernst von Glasersfeld, the view he opposes, metaphysical realism (MR), assumes that truth is a correspondence relation: when a concept (C) corresponds to the way the world (W) is, it is true (and false otherwise).
C ---corresponds ---->W = true
C ---fails to correspond--->W = false
Von Glasersfeld's central idea seems to be this: in order for me to know whether any given concept corresponds to some aspect of the world, and assuming that I have a clear understanding of the nature of correspondence itself, it seems that I would need independent access to two things: (1) the concept and (2) the relevant portion of the world. Only then will I be in a position to judge whether the two correspond. Obviously, I have (at least partial) access to my own concepts through simple reflection. Do I also have independent, nonconceptual access to the world? (It must be nonconceptual, otherwise I will be simply comparing my concepts with other of my concepts -- an activity more in line with the coherence theory of truth). Following the quote, I offer my reconstruction of von Glasersfeld's rejection of MR:
[T]he unanswerable question whether, or to what extent, any picture our senses "convey" might correspond to the "objective" reality is still today the crux of all theory of knowledge. Sextus used, among other things, an apple as an example. To our senses it appears smooth, scented, sweet, and yellow -- but it is far from self-evident that the real apple possesses these properties, just as it is not at all obvious that it does not possess other properties as well, properties that are simply not perceived by our senses. The question is unanswerable, because no matter what we do, we can check our perceptions only by means of other perceptions, but never with the apple as it might be before we perceive it.
----- E. von Glasersfeld, “An Introduction to Radical Constructivism”
1. All concepts are in the mind
2. All concepts are conceptualized
3. All concepts are concepts-of-some-x
4. All concepts-of-some-x are in the mind (from 1)
5. There can be no unconceptualized concepts-of-some-x (from 2)
6. All concepts of apples are concepts-of-some-x (from 3)
7. There can be no unconceptualized concepts of apples (from 5 and 6)
8. There can be no concept of an apple that is not a concept (truism)
9. The referent of the realist’s phrase “unconceptualized apple” is not (simply) a concept (an essential assumption of realism)
10. There can be no concepts of unconceptualized apples (from 8 and 9) (von G.: “…we cannot possibly conceive of an unexperienced world”)
11. Metaphysical realism (MR) involves concepts of unconceptualized apples. (By definition; here’s a typical realist concept: “if every concept-user were suddenly to disappear, apples – unconceptualized and unconceptualizable – would still exist.”)
12. MR is wrong and von Glasersfeld’s constructivism right (from 10 and 11)
Monday, December 01, 2025
Monday, September 29, 2025
(E&A) Giving animals their due: the argument from "marginal cases"
05_Tanner.indd (environmentandsociety.org)
Two versions of the AMC:
Reductio ad absurdum version:
1. In
order for an entity to acquire basic moral status – to matter morally, to be
one toward whom we have direct moral duties -- it must possess capacity C (for example,
language, or moral agency, or a complex sense of self, etc.).
2. Nonhuman
animals do not possess C.
Therefore,
3.
Nonhuman animals do not matter morally.
But,
4. Some
humans (infants, young children, the mentally impaired, etc.) do not possess C.
Therefore,
5. Some
humans do not matter morally. (An
“absurd” result.)
Formal
contradiction version:
1. In
order for an entity to acquire basic moral status – to matter morally, to be
one toward whom we have direct moral duties -- it must possess capacity C (for example,
language, or moral agency, or a complex sense of self, etc.).
2.
Nonhuman animals do not possess C.
Therefore,
3.
Nonhuman animals do not matter morally.
But,
4. Some
humans (infants, young children, the mentally impaired, etc.) do not possess C, and
5. All
humans matter morally.
Therefore,
6. It is
not the case that, in order for an entity to acquire basic moral status – to
matter morally, to be one toward whom we have direct moral duties -- it must
possess capacity C (for example, language, or moral agency, or a complex sense of self,
etc.). (That is, (1) is false.)
(It may be, for example, that basic moral status accrues to those who can suffer, are sentient, or experience pleasure/pain)