(i) I owe you money.
(ii) I promise to pay you that money.
Therefore, (iii) I ought to pay you that money.
Monday, March 31, 2008
(CR) Homework for Wednesday
1. Read Rice's "101 Reasons Why I'm A Vegetarian."
http://www.vivavegie.org/vvi/pdf/101reas2005.pdf
What percentage of the 101 do you find convincing? Which 2 strike you as most convincing?
What percentage of the 101, therefore, do you find unconvincing? Which 2 strike you as most unconvincing?
http://www.vivavegie.org/vvi/pdf/101reas2005.pdf
What percentage of the 101 do you find convincing? Which 2 strike you as most convincing?
What percentage of the 101, therefore, do you find unconvincing? Which 2 strike you as most unconvincing?
Tuesday, March 25, 2008
(LII) Gettier Problems
Here's a link to our next reading (for discussion on Monday; we will continue with Chapter 7 tomorrow).
Monday, March 24, 2008
(A&P; 10 am only) Wed.'s Reading
Here's the link:
http://www.rowan.edu/philosop/clowney/Aesthetics/philos_artists_onart/bell.htm
Also, Google "aesthetic emotion." Review the PowerPoint (first hit).
http://www.rowan.edu/philosop/clowney/Aesthetics/philos_artists_onart/bell.htm
Also, Google "aesthetic emotion." Review the PowerPoint (first hit).
Thursday, March 20, 2008
(A&P) Style Checklist
There's a broken link on my Geocities page. Go here for the Philosophy Department's Style Checklist.
Thursday, March 13, 2008
Yellow Ribbons for KBR?
Bush/Cheney-Speak: "support our troops" = "support our war profiteers."
(After all, we're only talking a mere $3,000,000,000,000 -- so far.)
(After all, we're only talking a mere $3,000,000,000,000 -- so far.)
Tuesday, March 11, 2008
(A&P) Critic of Weitz
Kenneth Lansing argues, against Weitz in particular, that we can and must define art. A brief excerpt:
"If art educators teach anything at all, they teach composition, artistic procedures or techniques, and skill building. But how can they justify the teaching of composition or design if there is no specific compositional characteristic that a work of art must possess? How can they justify efforts to develop skill in the handling of the tools and materials of art if such skill does not need to be reflected in works of art? Who is to say what students must know and be able to do in art if the production of art objects doesn't require any particular knowledge or ability?
Consequently, I am compelled to ask why someone doesn't entertain the idea that we may have assigned the term "work of art" unjustifiably to certain things in the past. Or is it "okay" to have thrown that term around carelessly only to discover, years later, that we can't define the nature of its referents because they don't have anything in common?
I am also compelled to ask how evaluation in art can be carried out in any logical fashion if we don't know what the subject is or what it requires. To get an idea of how important such a problem is, try applying it to a different discipline. Consider, for example, the fix that teachers of aeronautical engineering would be in if they didn't know what an airplane was."
"If art educators teach anything at all, they teach composition, artistic procedures or techniques, and skill building. But how can they justify the teaching of composition or design if there is no specific compositional characteristic that a work of art must possess? How can they justify efforts to develop skill in the handling of the tools and materials of art if such skill does not need to be reflected in works of art? Who is to say what students must know and be able to do in art if the production of art objects doesn't require any particular knowledge or ability?
Consequently, I am compelled to ask why someone doesn't entertain the idea that we may have assigned the term "work of art" unjustifiably to certain things in the past. Or is it "okay" to have thrown that term around carelessly only to discover, years later, that we can't define the nature of its referents because they don't have anything in common?
I am also compelled to ask how evaluation in art can be carried out in any logical fashion if we don't know what the subject is or what it requires. To get an idea of how important such a problem is, try applying it to a different discipline. Consider, for example, the fix that teachers of aeronautical engineering would be in if they didn't know what an airplane was."
Thursday, March 06, 2008
(LII) Gettier Problems
Not long ago, most philosophers were content to think of knowledge as "justified true belief." After the publication of Edmund Gettier's 3-page essay raising doubts about justification, the situation became a bit more complex. Here's one example (from an article by W. Lycan):
S has nonbasic knowledge that p iff (i) p is true; (ii) S believes that p; (iii) S’s justification renders p evident for S;…(iv*) [w]here ‘e’ designates the portion of S’s total evidence E that is immediately relevant to the justification of p, either (A) there is a nondefective causal chain from P to BSe; or (B) there is some event or state of affairs Q such that (i) there is a nondefective causal chain from Q to BSe; and (ii) there is a nondefective causal chain from Q to P; or (C) there is some event or state of affairs H such that (i) there is a nondefective causal chain from H to BSe; and (ii) H is a nondefective pseudo-overdeterminant of P. [Where a causal chain X ? Y is ‘defective’ with respect to S’s justification for p based on evidence e iff: Either (I) (a) there is some event or state of affairs U in X ? Y such that S would be justified in believing that U did not occur and (b) it is essential to S’s justifiably believing that p on the basis of the evidence e that S would be justified in believing that U did not occur; or (II) there is some significant alternative C* to X ? Y with respect to S justifiably believing that p on the basis of e. [Where C* is a ‘significant alternative’ to X ? Y with respect to S justifiably believing that p on the basis of e if (a) it is objectively likely that C* should have occurred rather than X ? Y ; and (b) if C* had occurred instead of X ? Y, then there would have been an event or state of affairs U in C* such that S would not be justified in believing that p if S were justified in believing that U occurred.]
S has nonbasic knowledge that p iff (i) p is true; (ii) S believes that p; (iii) S’s justification renders p evident for S;…(iv*) [w]here ‘e’ designates the portion of S’s total evidence E that is immediately relevant to the justification of p, either (A) there is a nondefective causal chain from P to BSe; or (B) there is some event or state of affairs Q such that (i) there is a nondefective causal chain from Q to BSe; and (ii) there is a nondefective causal chain from Q to P; or (C) there is some event or state of affairs H such that (i) there is a nondefective causal chain from H to BSe; and (ii) H is a nondefective pseudo-overdeterminant of P. [Where a causal chain X ? Y is ‘defective’ with respect to S’s justification for p based on evidence e iff: Either (I) (a) there is some event or state of affairs U in X ? Y such that S would be justified in believing that U did not occur and (b) it is essential to S’s justifiably believing that p on the basis of the evidence e that S would be justified in believing that U did not occur; or (II) there is some significant alternative C* to X ? Y with respect to S justifiably believing that p on the basis of e. [Where C* is a ‘significant alternative’ to X ? Y with respect to S justifiably believing that p on the basis of e if (a) it is objectively likely that C* should have occurred rather than X ? Y ; and (b) if C* had occurred instead of X ? Y, then there would have been an event or state of affairs U in C* such that S would not be justified in believing that p if S were justified in believing that U occurred.]
Tuesday, March 04, 2008
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